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ABSTRACT

The Bunker Hill Story: Welfare, Redevelopment, and Housing Crisis in Postwar Los Angeles
by
Stephen C. Jones

Advisor: Dr. Karen Miller
In 1955, Miss Elizabeth McClellan, an elderly resident of Bunker Hill, Los Angeles,
handwrote a letter to her city councilman. Her rapidly increasing rent was untenable, she
explained: “I find $24.00 is too high on an income of less than $40.00 per month.” She asked the
councilman if there was a place in Los Angeles where she could live affordably and within
walking distance of a church (McClellan, 1955). As she wrote, a bitter fight over Bunker Hill’s
fate was underway. To resolve what they characterized as “blighted conditions conducive to
[high] rates of disease, crime, and juvenile delinquency” (CRA, n.d.) the City was poised to evict
the Hill’s 9,000 residents, demolish its buildings, and regrade the steep incline as part of a
massive Urban Redevelopment Project.
Between roughly 1940-1970 pro-Renewal advocates defeated left-liberal bids for lowrent subsidized housing and successfully promoted a plan for private redevelopment
underwritten by public funds (Parson, 2005). The story of Bunker Hill concerns displacement of
working-class residents like Ms. McClellan and redistribution of wealth from middle-class
property owners and taxpayers citywide to downtown business elites, developers, and city
agencies. But this story is somewhat more complex than the manufacture of profit.
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By exploring primary and secondary sources, an inquiry into Urban Redevelopment in
Bunker Hill, Los Angeles facilitates a nuanced understanding of how political power is made and
maintained. Nearly every U.S. city was transformed in the years following WWII by an
expanding state, significant demographic change, and political economic flux. As the balance of
power swayed, the state and society were pressed into reconfiguration. Such periods of change
are occasioned by moral and ideological struggles that ultimately “influenc[e] the conception of
the world of the masses” (Hall, 1996 [1989]: 419). Across city council hearings, newspaper
broadsides, film and television, and personal and political relations, the extent and significance
of “urban decline,” “blight,” “slums,” and “moral delinquency” was defined and contested.
These struggles recast political formations and class solidarities in postwar Los Angeles, with
long-lasting consequences for the provisioning of the social wage.
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INTRODUCTION
Bunker Hill, Los Angeles
In 1955, Miss Elizabeth McClellan, an elderly resident of Bunker Hill, Los Angeles,
handwrote a letter to her city councilman. Her rapidly increasing rent was untenable, she
explained: “I find $24.00 is too high on an income of less than $40.00 per month” (McClellan,
1955). She asked the councilman if there was a place in Los Angeles where she could live
affordably and within walking distance of a church. At the time that she wrote, the largest Urban
Redevelopment project in the US was slated for her neighborhood. McClellan and every other
Bunker Hill resident would have to move elsewhere. Despite her increasingly unaffordable rent,
McClellan and other elderly residents enjoyed the convenience of living near downtown. For the
cost of a nickel, Bunker Hill residents took the short ride on Angels Flight, a small incline
railway, to the center of downtown. Grand Central Market, directly across the street from the
Angels Flight station, supplied fresh groceries. One could walk a few blocks to Pershing Square
to sit in the sun or shade, chat with neighbors, or stroll around the park. And Los Angeles’s
famous department stores were nearby. Bunker Hill residents, it seemed, had everything near at
hand.
In 1959, when evictions from Bunker Hill were imminent, another resident wrote to her
councilman to express the desire to stay put. She relayed her and other residents’ frustration “at
the idea of living any further from the immediate downtown than [we] now do, at possibly
paying higher prices for the same groceries than [we] get at the Grand Central Market” (Starr,
1959). Starr and her husband did not want to move.

This, despite the increasing disrepair of their apartment. She described to her councilman
that the apartment’s flooring was warped, the linoleum on the bathroom and kitchen floors was
cracked. There were worsening cracks in the walls and ceilings. When it rained, she wrote, “the
downpour gets ‘in.’” With each rain, she explained, “the plaster would get sloppy-wet and later
dry to crumble on the floor. […] In past weeks, a large chunk of plaster fell abruptly to the
floor.” But this was home. She had lived there with her husband for “more years than we care to
recall.”
Bunker Hill’s residents did move, whether they wanted to or not. The dilapidated
apartments were torn down. Rather than new housing for Bunker Hill’s longtime residents and
other middle- and low-income downtown dwellers, luxury apartment buildings, hotels, and banks
were constructed.
Bunker Hill was a dense residential neighborhood on the western edge of downtown Los
Angeles. It was seen as a problem by business and city officials since the early 1900s. The Hill
was very steep, and its roads were very narrow. Early city maps listed the area as “Impassable
For Teams” – the narrow, uneven, and dangerously steep roads were not safe for horse-drawn
carriages (Adler, 1964). So, in 1901 the city decided to simply drill through the Hill to ease
travel into and out of Downtown from the West. Two additional tunnels in 1924 made it possible
for automobiles to avoid Bunker Hill entirely while traveling in or out of downtown. This solved
a problem for commuters, but it also isolated the Hill from downtown and the West side, since
one simply did not ever have to step foot on the Hill if she didn’t live there.
At the end of the 19th century Bunker Hill was a swanky residential district – Los
Angeles’s first suburb. Wealthy industrialists settled on Bunker Hill in the boom years following
the Civil War. They built lavish Victorian mansions on the Hill, above the din and dirt of the
2

growing city. As the new century dawned and L.A. grew, Bunker Hill’s wealthy residents left for
new suburban enclaves west of the city where they were definitively sheltered from Downtown’s
bustling commerce and growing labor class (Adler, 1964). In the first two decades of the 20th
century, Bunker Hill transitioned to a working-class neighborhood. The mansions were
subdivided into apartments, and dozens of rooming houses and hotels were built (Dawson,
2008). Workers arriving from the Midwest, Europe, and Mexico found affordable and centrallylocated housing on Bunker Hill.
Situated, as it was, so close to the central city, Bunker Hill’s dense, working-class makeup was viewed as problematic for profitable downtown development. As early as 1929 a local
developer proposed the total erasure of Bunker Hill using hydraulic mining equipment – the hill
would simply be washed away. “Bunker Hill,” the developer proclaimed, “has been a barrier to
progress in the business district of Los Angeles, preventing the natural expansion westward”
(Qtd. in Adler, 1964: 29). The stock market crash of that year and the ensuing Depression put a
damper on those grand designs. But his threats presaged Bunker Hill’s fate.
For several reasons, Bunker Hill came to be viewed as an out-of-place urban
anachronism. The area was dense, most residents did not drive cars, and the buildings were
relatively old. Los Angeles was supposed to be a city of sunshine, wide open space, and
automobiles – a modern city. Bunker Hill’s residents were almost exclusively low-income and
newly-arrived immigrants. According to the 1940 census, Bunker Hill’s population increased
19% between 1930 and 1940 at the same time that rental space decreased. Twenty percent of the
residents were foreign-born, predominantly Mexican immigrants. More than seventy-five percent
of residents had less than eight years of schooling. And Bunker Hill’s housing was the oldest in
the city, with the median date of construction 1895 (Adler, 1964).
3

In the late-1940s, Bunker Hill’s drab exterior and impoverished inhabitants became the
backdrop for many brooding films noir. As Jim Dawson writes, directors chose Bunker Hill to
frame their “troubling, starkly lit, almost documentary-style dramas about down-on-their-luck,
hard-hit people in postwar urban America. None of the human characters were ever more
desperate looking – or compelling – than the Bunker Hill locations themselves” (Dawson 2008:
87). Bunker Hill’s on-screen fame ensured that many Angelenos regarded the neighborhood as a
decrepit, dangerous place.
A number of solutions were advanced for Bunker Hill, each one the subject of intense
political controversy and struggle. Contemporary liberal reformers argued that Bunker Hill’s
condition was symptomatic of systemic issues relating to aging infrastructure and economic
inequality across the city. Reformers proposed large-scale planning that would “modernize” the
city. Specifically, they envisioned a modern capitalist infrastructure that would facilitate growth
– more specifically, infrastructure and property redevelopment that would raise land values and
spur tax revenue (Alexander & Bryant, 1951). Ports and highways would provide for the
transport of goods and people; a redeveloped downtown would reinvigorate commercial
consumption and raise municipal tax revenue; and a large-scale housing program including lowrent public housing near Downtown and other manufacturing districts would sustain Los
Angeles’s laboring class. Liberal reformers proposed that Bunker Hill be completely
redeveloped, its old structures removed and replaced with large, market-rate apartment houses.
The current residents of Bunker Hill would be relocated to a low-rent public housing project just
beyond the downtown area.
Pro-redevelopment real estate elites (both within and without city agencies) broadly
agreed with reformers’ vision of modern Los Angeles, but vigorously opposed public housing.
4

Representatives of prominent banks, insurance agencies, downtown department stores, real estate
interests, the Los Angeles Times and other newspaper publishers agreed that updated
infrastructure and a redeveloped downtown were necessary components of a modern capitalist
Los Angeles. But the coalition – which held substantial investments in downtown real estate –
organized an intense opposition to proposals in the early 1950s to construct thousands of public
housing units near downtown. They viewed public housing as a direct threat to current and future
real estate investments. Thus, they organized a successful lobbying campaign that equated public
housing with communist threats to the American way of life (Parson, 2005). Downtown real
estate interests organized instead a publicly-funded redevelopment project in which Bunker Hill
was transferred to private real estate developers below market value, which was approved by
City officials in March 1959 (Community Redevelopment Agency [CRA], 1970). Whereas
liberal reformers had planned Bunker Hill as a middle-income apartment housing district, proredevelopment elites advocated for luxury high-rise apartment housing, office space, up-market
hotels, parking facilities, and a Civic Trade Plaza & Auditorium (Babcock, 1956). Proredevelopment interests noted that redevelopment on Bunker Hill would spur growth for
business and real estate in L.A.’s Central Business District (Babcock, 1956).
Owners of property on Bunker Hill opposed both factions, insofar as redevelopment
would force them to sell their lucrative rental units. Owners organized to oppose both public
housing and redevelopment. Instead, they advocated a rehabilitation program, wherein Federal
Housing Administration loans would be provided to owners who wished to rehabilitate their
dilapidated properties or construct new ones (McInerny, et al.., n.d.).
The Bunker Hill story demonstrates a major shift toward the commodification of housing.
Liberal reformers viewed redevelopment as a tool to sustain the modern capitalist city through
5

housing, infrastructure, and commerce. Their grand plans for public and private housing would
have institutionalized inequality and segregation by displacing low-income residents from the
central city to a consolidated public housing project. Their plans, nevertheless, would have
allowed thousands of low-income people to secure decent, stable, and affordable housing.
Liberal reformers, furthermore, believed that housing was the basis for making a better world
(Parson, 2005). Liberal planners and architects in Los Angeles experimented with the form of
housing as part of their vision of social reform. In other words, liberal reformers rejected the
commodification of shelter. Housing was valuable in its capacity as a social lynchpin, far beyond
its capacity to generate profit.
Pro-redevelopment real estate elites, on the other hand, accelerated the commodification
of housing in Los Angeles. Elites were aligned with reformers’ plans to raise land values on
Bunker Hill. Their vision of urban development also exacerbated inequality and segregation.
But, whereas liberal reformers’ plans for public housing and other provisions would have
ensured a measure of security for some low- and middle-income residents, real estate elites
provided no such protections. Redevelopment on Bunker Hill displaced low-income residents
from the central city and forced them to seek housing wherever they could find it. New housing
developments on the Hill were, furthermore, luxury high-rises which would have been affordable
only to L.A.’s wealthy residents. Real estate elites dispensed with reformers’ broader social
goals. For them, real estate development was valuable only insofar as it produced return-oninvestment. They organized to gain control over the pattern of urban development. Through
legislation, real estate elites transferred power from the federal and state to the local level. For
local elites, the purpose of political struggle over redevelopment was to gentrify the central city
and amplify real estate investment.
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The Bunker Hill story also disrupts commonsense tropes regarding liberal and
conservative political activities. It is often claimed that liberals want to grow the government,
whereas conservatives seek smaller government. The historical evidence from postwar Los
Angeles does not support this assertion. Local actors across the political spectrum - reformers,
business elites, and property owners - each organized at the city, state, and federal levels. They
leveraged federal and state housing legislation, and attempted (sometimes successfully) to
introduce and reform welfare state laws in ways that would advance their specific political
economic goals. In other words, both liberal and conservative factions built and tweaked the
state’s capacity to build Bunker Hill in their image.
In 1945, at the height of the housing crisis in Los Angeles, the California Redevelopment
Law was created. Redevelopment was a significant turning point in the state’s approach to the
housing question. With public housing, the state directly addressed the provision of housing for
low-income people and exercised maximum control over the planning, construction, and
management of these developments. Redevelopment, on the other hand, grew the responsibility
of private entities with regard to housing provision and urban development. At the same time,
while private entities were allowed to profit from redevelopment, public agencies shouldered a
great deal of the costs for acquiring and preparing land in redevelopment areas. The shift from
public housing provision to redevelopment was, broadly speaking, a shift from social service
provision to subsidized profit. California, which established the first redevelopment agencies in
the US, was the breeding ground for this political economic shift.
The pages that follow are focused on the U.S. welfare state, especially the redevelopment
provisions of the 1949 Housing Act. I disregard popular debates regarding so-called “deserving”
or “undeserving” poor. Instead, I focus on structure. More specifically, I highlight how political
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coalitions organized to build the welfare state for their own benefit. In the arguments that follow,
I consider the following question with regard to welfare, redevelopment, and housing in postwar
Los Angeles: Whose welfare was ensured by the state? I argue that federal, state, and local
welfare legislation provided only minimum protections and opportunities for poor Americans.
From its inception, the U.S. welfare state was concerned with sustaining capitalist growth, along
with its corollary, inequality. Of course, liberal provisions such as roads, schools, parks, and
public housing represented modest downward redistributions of wealth. But welfare state
provisions have more often distributed wealth upward, into the hands of private real estate
interests and suburban families, to name two examples.
In my discussion of welfare state structure, I hope also to counter popular arguments
regarding so-called “government incompetence,” or the “failure” of the welfare state. The
historical evidence from postwar Los Angeles demonstrates that the welfare state was, in fact, in
great working order. It succeeded in what it was designed to do, namely, the upward transfer of
public and private wealth. Again, the contours of the U.S. welfare state were not shaped
incidentally, but through deliberate and organized political struggle, the specifics of which are
explored in some detail below.
Bunker Hill in Context: Los Angeles, CA 1870-1970
Bunker Hill emerged as a “problem” for political action as Los Angeles was undergoing
wide-ranging political economic changes. By the end of the Second World War, L.A. had
witnessed unprecedented transformations in demographics and economic development. Spurred
by rapid growth, political groups of all stripes – workers, reformers, and various capitalist
factions – organized fiercely to gain power. Bunker Hill was one arena, among many, where this
struggle was waged.
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In the immediate postwar, downtown Los Angeles was in decline. According to City
officials, “blight” was rampant in the city. In particular, they pointed to substandard housing;
falling tax revenue; rising social service costs; and health, fire, and moral hazards. Downtown
business elites agreed. “We are disturbed over the blight conditions in our City,” stated one bank
executive. These conditions, he added, “are sapping economic and tax-producing strength”
throughout the downtown area (Braunschweiger, 1955). Amid fervent suburbanization, many felt
Los Angeles was losing coherence. “The city has to have a center to it,” stated one department
store owner, “you have to have a hub like a wheel. If you let the hub deteriorate, you haven’t got
much to be suburban to” (Qtd. in Gottleib & Wolt, 1977: 307). Thus, business elites hoped to
reassert downtown Los Angeles as the commercial and cultural center of the region. Beginning
in the late 1940s, they organized themselves both within and without City agencies to redevelop
downtown. This coalition sought to replace downtown’s aging housing stock – as well as its lowincome residents – with a music center, luxury housing, and corporate headquarters.
Bunker Hill, just west of the central business district, was identified early on as a primary
focus for redevelopment. The area was long understood to impede the growth of downtown
business interests. “Bunker Hill has been a barrier to progress in the business district of Los
Angeles, preventing the natural expansion westward,” stated one developer in 1929, as part of a
proposal to completely erase the Hill using hydraulic mining equipment (Adler, 1964). With
steep, narrow roads, the area was mostly inaccessible to cars. To facilitate automobile travel, the
city alternatively tunneled through and paved over Bunker Hill. Third Street tunnel in 1901,
Broadway and Second Street tunnels in 1924, and the carving of the Harbor Freeway into Bunker
Hill’s western edge in the late 1940s contributed to the area’s isolation and deterioration.
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By the 1950s, city officials claimed the Hill was a hotbed of crime, disease, fire, and
structural decay. Los Angeles Police Department’s Central Vice, in a report submitted to the City
Council, stated, “this section […] has become the place of abode for pimps, prostitutes, narcotic
peddlers, addicts and the too numerous to mention petty gamblers and thieves who ply their
respective trades in the areas adjacent to the Bunker Hill district” (Carter, 1956). According to a
survey conducted by the Health Department, a majority of residential structures in the area were
either substandard or extremely substandard and needed to be demolished. (Health Department,
1956). The City Planning Department stated Bunker Hill’s mixed use development and obsolete
street pattern were depressing land values in the downtown area (Planning Department, 1956).
An official from the Community Redevelopment Agency (the city bureaucracy responsible for
organizing renewal projects) advocated for “the elimination of the health, fire, and police
problems on Bunker Hill and the redevelopment of the area into a multiple-residence area
providing housing adjacent to [downtown] and returning a high tax yield to the city” (Sesnon,
1955). In the end, the City Council agreed that redevelopment was “urgently needed for the
immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety” (Ordinance No. 104,408, n.d.).
While pro-redevelopment interests emphasized social disorder and structural
deterioration, they did not discuss wide-ranging shifts in political economy that were underway.
Since 1870, Los Angeles’s historical geography had been shaped by expansions in population
and urban development whose pace and intensity were unmatched by any other U.S. metropolis.
Rapid economic development between 1900 and 1920 quadrupled the region’s population;
between 1920 and 1940 the population doubled again. This massive influx laid the foundation
for what would become the nation’s leading industrial metropolis (Scott & Soja, 1996).
According to historian Eric Avila, industrialization of the regional economy during the second
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quarter of the twentieth century drew to L.A. a labor force that was racially and ethnically
diverse. These newcomers arrived as L.A.’s New Deal political culture coalesced around “public
spaces such as factories, street fronts, streetcars, nightclubs, amusement parks, ethnic
neighborhoods, community centers, and parks.” Thus, urban culture in LA during this period was
characterized by what Avila describes as a “heterosociality of public life” that undermined
Progressive era visions of a generation prior which sought “to create a racially and ethnically
homogenous society” (Avila, 2004: 25-6).
L.A.’s rapid demographic growth brought workers from across the U.S., southern and
central Europe, Japan, and, especially, Mexico. “In 1920,” write geographers Allen J. Scott and
Edward W. Soja, “Mexicans had become the largest immigrant group in Los Angeles.” Intense
successions of migration centered on L.A “reinforced the character of Los Angeles as the most
racially diverse – and racially segregated – of Pacific Coast cities” (1996: 6) The Depression
years, especially, set L.A. apart. Unlike other U.S. cities, L.A.’s population and economy
continued to grow in the 1930s. By the end of the decade, Avila writes, “Los Angeles County
ranked first nationally in agricultural income, as well as in the production of airplanes and
motion pictures, second in auto assembling and retail trade, fourth in women’s apparel, and fifth
in the overall value of industrial production” (2004: 26). While L.A. cemented its status as a
major manufacturing city, brutal class warfare and an open shop that lasted well into the
twentieth century kept the region’s accelerating wealth out of the hands of L.A.’s working-class
(Scott & Soja, 1996: 7).
Industrial and agricultural development centered on particular neighborhoods such as
Watts, Boyle Heights, and El Monte, where workers forged political alliances across barriers of
work, race, and ethnicity. Although L.A.’s labor movements were comparatively weaker than in
11

the large industrial cities of the East and Midwest, the 1930s nevertheless occasioned powerful
labor organizing. At the height of the Great Depression – as joblessness, homelessness, and
hunger became widespread – communists organized rural and urban workers to stage strikes and
demonstrations. Radical and reformist political pressure mounted while California promoted
piecemeal responses or looked the other way. In L.A., the Communist Party, historian John
Laslett states, “was the first to tackle unemployment head on, […] and it was the only one to take
the special plight of racial minorities into account” (2012: 113). Organizers established broadbased networks across the city to protest evictions, unemployment, and the inadequacy of
welfare (Laslett, 2012). During this period, Avila states, “Mexican American men and women
struggled alongside blacks, Jews, and whites to improve the workplace conditions for
longshoremen and cannery and defense workers, and to elect public officials who defended the
interests of the city’s working class” (2004: 26). Grassroots struggle pushed the Democratic
Party leftward – a move underlined by socialist Upton Sinclair’s nearly successful 1934
gubernatorial campaign, End Poverty in California. Although Sinclair lost his bid, the New Deal
coalition had gained significant ground in L.A. by 1936. “In 1930,” writes Laslett, “all of the
city’s twenty-two state assembly were held by Republicans. But after 1936, the Democrats held
sixteen assembly seats, whereas the Republicans held only six” (2012: 129).
The nationwide postwar economic boom also fueled disproportionate growth in L.A.
Between 1940 and 1970 the region’s population tripled - Los Angeles County grew from 2.8
million to more than 7 million (Scott & Soja, 1996). During this period, housing, highways, and
industry expanded in earnest beyond Los Angeles City. Helped along by segregationist federal
housing policy, many whites of all classes migrated from the city center to suburban peripheries
further and further afield (Avila, 2004). Changing job structure also exacerbated inequality.
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African-Americans were pushed out of high-wage aerospace, electronics, and defense jobs by
whites returning from the Second World War. While public and private money flowed to L.A.’s
fledgling residential and industrial suburbs, Downtown and East L.A. suffered disinvestment.
Thus, “extreme poverty” concentrated in L.A. where Black people had settled (Gilmore, 2007:
39).
In sum, as Los Angeles grew to new heights of industrial power, political economic
conditions were organized to keep wealth out of reach for most workers – especially workers of
color and immigrants. Housing policy was an essential tool in this regard. Political struggle
surrounding the “problem” of Bunker Hill, which I explore in detail in Chapter 2 below,
illustrated the ways that various factions proposed to shape and utilize federal and state housing
policies to wage this class war.
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CHAPTER 1
Growth, Liberalism, and U.S. Welfare
In the following pages I discuss in some detail a number of local cases where U.S.
welfare state policies – particularly as it related to housing – was implemented in ways that
exacerbated inequality and residential segregation. I also broadly survey the history of the U.S.
welfare state.
When the United States entered the Great Depression, much of the nation’s housing was
obsolete by government standards. Officials characterized the conditions in which millions of
Americans lived as deleterious to health, safety, and morals (Bellush & Hausknect, 1967).
Quality of life problems were compounded foreclosures. To alleviate the housing crisis, the
federal government stepped in to an extent unprecedented in the nation’s history.
Establishment of the Public Works Administration (1933) and Federal Housing Authority
(1934) created powers to clear substandard housing and provide funds to homeowners and
developers for repair and construction (Bellush & Hausknecht, 1967). Amid local opposition,
large-scale clearance and low-cost public housing construction proceeded. While many poor
urban dwellers did benefit from new construction, Bellush and Hausknect state, “the focus [was]
not on dealing with the problems of urban dwellers as such, but on stimulating the economy”
(1967: 8). In the absence of a simultaneous building program, the clearance of dilapidated
housing actually exacerbated the housing shortage and raised rental prices. The provision of
federal funding in the 1930s boosted a lagging economy; but the housing crisis remained acute.
The 1949 Housing Act extended these shortcomings. In concession to public housing
opponents, Title I of the Act created provisions for urban redevelopment. Under Title I, federal
14

money was provided to municipal housing authorities to plan and execute redevelopment
projects. Cities purchased land in areas identified as “blighted” (i.e., dilapidated and in need of
redevelopment) and sold it to private developers at a mark-down. “In other words,” Bellush and
Hausknect explain, “Title I subsidized the purchase of prime land by private entrepreneurs, with
the federal government paying the lion’s share of the subsidy” (1967: 12). Developers were free
to construct luxury housing, low-rent private housing, commercial or industrial development, or
other uses. As a result, swathes of aging, but low-cost housing was demolished, working-class
residents were displaced, while commerce, industry, and middle-class housing took their place.
Urban historians refer to this period of intense government involvement in urban
development as “growth liberalism” (Hirsch, 1978; Miller, 2014; Self, 2005). In theory, growth
liberalism was an optimistic attempt to fashion a more democratic and egalitarian city through
large-scale planning. While growth liberals were optimistic reformers, they were still capitalists.
Economic growth, especially property value and tax revenue increases, mattered a lot for growth
liberals. In practice, liberal federal housing policy beginning in the 1930s worsened the national
housing shortage and deepened inequality in at least three ways. First, as I mentioned above,
“slum clearance” by the Public Works Administration demolished low-cost (though dilapidated)
housing and replaced it with fewer units whose rents were unaffordable to poor urban dwellers.
Second, in the absence of adequate relocation provisions, displaced residents were removed from
centrally-located urban areas and relegated to crowded, deteriorated, and racially segregated
residential areas. Third, suburbanization and urban redevelopment accumulated wealth in the
hands of white property owners and business elites at the expense of working- and middle-class
urban dwellers, especially African Americans and immigrants.
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Federal, state, and local governments have consistently and extensively participated in
the construction of racial geographies. In Managing Inequality: Northern Racial Liberalism in
Interwar Detroit, Karen Miller shows how slum clearance and low-cost housing projects “upheld
and formalized residential segregation in Detroit” (2014: 11). Through activism, African
Americans won concessions from the New Deal state. They fought for political autonomy and
unfettered access to the city’s resources, including housing, sidewalks, buses, and social service
provisions (2014: 240). But, while white northern liberals promoted racial equality in rhetoric,
they fashioned a state and city that “was neither politically nor economically redistributive”
(2014: 13). Slum clearance displaced poor black residents who were not guaranteed relocation.
Construction of segregated public housing formalized black Detroiters’ residential isolation.
These strategies were reproduced by cities across the U.S. in the years following World
War II. The ghetto of postwar Chicago, for example, Arnold Hirsch states, was “reinforced with
tax payer’s dollars and shored up with the power of the state” (1978: 10). Again, residential
segregation was the result of deliberate policies carried out by the state – urban redevelopment,
suburbanization, and public housing policies, in particular. Although white racist terrorist
violence in the first half of the century largely shaped Chicago’s South Side ghettos, the sheer
numbers of southern African Americans who migrated to Chicago beginning in 1940 led blacks
to settle in previously all-white neighborhoods (1978: 5). Subsidized by the Federal Housing
Authority and Home Owner Loan Corporation, whites migrated to the suburbs. In their wake,
block busting, housing shortage, and landlord speculation precipitated the physical decline of
Chicago’s mostly-black South Side neighborhoods. Chicago’s city government, then, touted
crowding and substandard residential conditions as reasons to demolish neighborhoods, move
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residents to other segregated and deteriorated neighborhoods, and use the land for middle-class
housing and institutional expansion (1978: 10).
Postwar Oakland also witnessed wide-ranging “redistributions” of power, wealth, and
people. “Jobs, investment, and taxable wealth left the city,” Robert Self states. “Redevelopment
transferred property from residents to private developers. African Americans, displaced by urban
renewal, moved into new neighborhoods. Tens of thousands of whites left for the suburbs, others
remained in the city but moved away from their black neighbors” (2003: 138). The state gave
particular shape to these redistributions. Segregationist housing policies provided means and
incentives for whites to migrate to Oakland’s suburban periphery. Redevelopment in West
Oakland displaced working-class residents (especially African Americans), dispossessed middleclass property owners and small businesses, and enriched private developers. A more segregated
and unequal city resulted from these dislocations.
It is important to recognize the political economic factors that pushed and pulled people,
capital, and government in tumultuous interwar and postwar years. The introduction to the
Northern political economy of the automated assembly line, “and its counterpart, an aggressive
Americanization program among workers by the beginning of the World War I, […] helped
support the rhetoric of racial equality, since it assumed that individual workers should not be
differentiated from each other based on their non-work-related identities” (Miller, 2014: 8). In
other words, to facilitate economic growth both capitalists and state officials innovated political
ideologies regarding “racial equality”. Analogously, administrators of Detroit’s slum clearance
and low-income housing programs saw themselves as allies of African Americans; but “their
vision meant the removal of the poorest black residents from the city’s downtown district, as
well as the expansion and formalization of residential segregation” (Miller, 2014: 240). The
17

language of “racial equality” was amplified as unequal class and racial hierarchies were
simultaneously ushered in.
United States cities were remade politically, economically, geographically, and racially in
the years following World War II. The upheavals of this period included large-scale
demographic redistribution within the U.S., state expansion at all levels, and political economic
flux characterized, in part, by industrial restructuring, suburbanization, and urban redevelopment.
These changes threatened the hegemony of many powerful elements. As whites left for the
suburbs, downtown business elites and municipal governments suffered lagging property values
and decreased business and tax revenues. “Powerful, but severely threatened,” business elites
lobbied municipal powers to devise and implement redevelopment strategies (Hirsch, 1978:
101). In cities across the U.S. – including, as we shall see, Los Angeles – redevelopment was
neither concerned with housing the city’s most vulnerable residents (the elderly, low-income,
and war veterans), nor easing persistent housing shortages. Redevelopment was intended, on the
one hand, to attract middle-class and wealthy consumers and, on the other, to enrich private
interests situated downtown.
The outcome of political struggle is never predetermined, however. As Hirsch states, “the
postwar era provided, theoretically at least, an opportunity for dismantling, instead of expanding,
the ghetto. […] Indeed, the real tragedy surrounding the emergence of the modern ghetto is not
that it has been inherited but that it has been periodically renewed and strengthened” (Hirsch,
1978: 5-6). Americans of every race, class, and region struggled to direct the form and meaning
of growth liberalism. As Self shows, for example, African American Oaklanders “imagined the
city and its possibilities, reacted to urban decline and decay, and fashioned politics and social
movements with the ambition of making their neighborhoods and cities better places to live”
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(2003: 13). The question, then, for scholars and activists is what constitutes the political power
necessary to shape the urban environment?
At present, business and real estate elites have largely succeeded in shaping national,
state, and local housing and welfare state policies. One example of this success is the mortgageinterest deduction for homeowners. Sociologist Matthew Davis’s profile of upper-income
families showed how this works.
Ohene Asare, founder of a technology consulting company, and Ré gine Jean-Charles,
tenured professor at Boston College, lived with their four children in Milton, MA. They owned a
beautiful, four-bedroom house worth $665,000 and earned a combined annual income of about
$290,000, which put them in the top 5 percent of national household incomes in 2017.
Sociologist Matthew David (2017) profiled Asare and Jean-Charles and many other families, to
shed light on the kinds of structural support wealthy homeowners receive from the government.
Asare and Jean-Charles were helped along by a tax break called the mortgage-interest deduction
(MID) that allowed U.S. homeowners to deduct mortgage interest and other real estate costs such
as property taxes. In 2015, the family claimed $21,686 in MID, which translated to a savings of
$470 per month. For homeowners nationwide in 2015, the MID and other real estate tax breaks
amounted to a $134 billion subsidy – greater than the combined budgets of the Departments of
Education, Justice, and Energy that year. Desmond dubbed the MID and associated deductions,
“a generous public housing program for the rich” (2017).
Crisaliz Diaz lived with her two sons in a two-bedroom apartment not far from Asare.
She worked for HomeStart, a nonprofit focused on ending and preventing homelessness, where
Asara served on the advisory board. Unlike Asare, however, Diaz earned $38,000 a year (putting
her near the bottom third of American household incomes) and paid $1,385 each month in rent
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alone (more than 40 percent of her paycheck). Diaz had virtually no savings and relied on credit
cards each month to afford necessities like toilet paper and soap. Any unforeseen expenses
would have placed her and her family at risk of eviction. Despite this, Desmond wrote, “Diaz
receives no housing assistance.” He continued,
The last time Boston accepted new applications for rental-assistance Section 8 vouchers was nine
years ago, when for a few precious weeks you were allowed to place your name on a very long
waiting list. Boston is not atypical in that way. In Los Angeles, the estimated wait time for a
Section 8 voucher is 11 years. In Washington, the waiting list for housing vouchers is closed
indefinitely, and over 40,000 people have applied for public housing alone (2017).

Low-income renters like Diaz face the private rental market alone, where soaring costs claim
more and more of their income.
A prevailing assumption, said Desmond, is that most low-income families receive some
form of government assistance – such as public housing or Section 8 subsidies. The opposite,
however, is true. He wrote, “nationwide, only one in four households that qualifies for rental
assistance receives it.” In 2017, he continued, more than half of all poor U.S. families spent more
than 50 percent of their income on housing, while one in four spent in excess of 70 percent
(Desmond, 2017). A staggering number of working Americans who receive no housing
assistance, simply transfer the majority of their income to landlords and utility companies.
Real estate capitalists receive rental payments from their tenants in addition to generous
federal and state subsidies. Journalist Alec MacGillis showed how this works (2017). He
investigated rental properties in Baltimore, MD, where there is no public housing for a
population of 825,000. MacGillis dubbed the roughly 20,000 tenants of rental properties he
investigated “the modern precariat – […] casino workers, distribution-warehouse pickers, Uber
drivers, students at for-profit colleges.” While some of these individuals received Section 8
housing vouchers, most paid their own rent, ranging from about $800 to $1,300. High costs for
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these Baltimore residents were greatly compounded, MacGillis wrote, by the landlord’s
aggressive rent-collection practices. Tenants were slapped with excessive fees, and many were
dragged through court to recover late payment. Management was also negligent with property
maintenance, MacGillis wrote. Tenants reported broken appliances, pest infestations, holes in the
walls, mold, leaks, and cracks which let in rain and snow. In these situations, residents paid
exorbitantly for housing that may have harmed their health.
Most tenants did not know, according to MacGillis, that their negligent landlord was
Jared Kushner, President Donald Trump’s son-in-law and, until recently, chief executive of a
sprawling real estate empire. Following the housing market collapse in 2007, Kushner
Companies purchased tens of thousands of foreclosed middle-range rental units. In 2012,
according to MacGillis, “a Kushner-led investment group bought 5,500 multifamily units in the
Baltimore area with $371 million in financing from Freddie Mac, the government-backed
mortgage lender.” Generous government lending, in other words, buoyed Kushner companies as
it scooped up properties at foreclosure prices.
These brief examples illustrate large-scale, government-sanctioned upward distributions
of wealth. The accumulation of real estate by wealthy entrepreneurs is subsidized by generous
federal loans. Homeowners with larger mortgages save more money each month on housing
costs. Renters, on the other hand, face stagnant wages and find greater proportions of their
income scraped into the hands of landlords and service providers. How and why do government
subsidies flow so easily to wealthy homeowners and real estate capitalists, while low-income
renters are largely left to fend for themselves?
As we have seen, government subsidies are political economic tools intended to stimulate
growth. Housing policy in the U.S. has historically been structured to push funds into the hands
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of real estate interests and wealthy homeowners. The modern U.S. state, in other words, is
principally concerned with the accumulation of wealth and the maintenance of inequality. The
Bunker Hill story demonstrates the nuts-and-bolts of how local capitalist interests organized to
shape housing policy for precisely this purpose. Before ratcheting down to the local level,
however, it may be helpful to broadly review how the U.S. welfare state developed at the
national level.
The Emergence of U.S. Welfare
The U.S. welfare state was organized to address problems associated with industrialization,
urbanization, and rapid population growth at the beginning of the twentieth century. Mass
migration to cities strained infrastructure and posed serious problems for U.S. city dwellers and
governments. City and town governments stumbled over deepening crises of housing,
transportation, sanitation, water-supply, healthcare, schooling, and poverty. Harms associated
with these living conditions, such as disease and crime, boomed in densely populated workingclass residential areas. These soon spread beyond the “slums,” threatening all city dwellers
(Garland, 2016).
Economic crises of the 1890s and 1930s greatly compounded problems of urban inequality.
Mass unemployment and runaway inflation were met by labor opposition. Workers organized to
oppose their living and working conditions – some organized poor relief, others articulated anticapitalist alternatives to social and economic inequality. “The events of these years,” wrote
sociologist David Garland, “shifted the balance of political power and the character of social
relations, increasing the influence of trade unions and working people” (2016: 38). Thus, New
Deal policies emerged as an answer to extreme inequality and political-economic instability.
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Social welfare programs that present-day readers may take for granted took shape as a
response to this political economic flux. Social insurance against income loss; income supports
through food stamps, Earned Income Tax Credits, Medicaid, free school meals, and General
Assistance; publicly-funded social services such as public schools, affordable housing, parks,
and transportation; social services such as probation, social work, and child services; and
government of the economy through tax laws, fiscal policy, minimum wages laws, etc. – these
and many other measures were inaugurated with the U.S. welfare state. It is important to
consider, Garland wrote, that welfare programs were aimed at preserving the status quo. “Social
welfare,” he wrote, “was made to humanize capitalism – but also to make it more resistant to
socialist challenge” (2016: 42). While welfare programs did – and continue to – alleviate
suffering and provide opportunities for many poor people, the principal concern was, Garland
continued, to “stimulate demand, keep money circulating, prompt investment, and sustain
commerce” (2016: 42).
Federal housing policy, which took shape in the wake of the Great Depression, is one part of
this legacy. In 1929, the nation’s wealth soared to unprecedented levels. At the same time, about
50 per cent of all U.S. families survived on minimum subsistence income. Over the next several
years, following the economic collapse, hundreds of thousands of homeowners lost their property
through foreclosures. Real estate construction stagnated while housing needs became
increasingly dire (Bellush & Hausknecht, 1964). Thus, in the early 1930s, poverty and instability
worsened for poor Americans and grasped many more.
To stimulate growth, quell dissent, and alleviate the plight of some, the federal government
greatly expanded its involvement in real estate. In 1933 the Roosevelt administration established
the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC). The HOLC loaned billions to homeowners and
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refinanced existing mortgages at lower interest rates and longer repayment periods. In other
words, the HOLC redistributed wealth downward to homeowners, securing modest housing
stability for many. Renters and other poor urban and rural dwellers, however, were not extended
similar subsidies. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) was established in 1934. The FHA
insured new mortgages and loans for repair and construction with low interest rates and long
repayment periods. FHA loans subsidized repair and construction undertaken by landlords,
developers, and other real estate entrepreneurs. FHA-insured mortgages also shielded property
owners from risk. If homeowners defaulted on mortgages, the government would cover the cost
instead of banks or landlords. Through FHA and HOLC outlays, the federal government bailed
out homeowners and shielded real estate entrepreneurs from risk.
The Public Works Administration (PWA) (established 1933) and the United States Housing
Authority (USHA) (established 1937 as part of that year’s Housing Act) created powers for cities
to clear aging residential sections and construct low-rent public housing. In addition to providing
shelter for urban poor, the PWA and USHA administered many publicly-funded social services
such as public schools, libraries, parks, transportation, and other amenities. These amenities were
distinct from public housing in that they were provided equally to all, not just low-income
residents. For this reason, public works represented the most egalitarian aspects of the welfare
state, akin to “social rights.” Public infrastructure was not, however, politically neutral. New
Deal reformers designed, organized, and implemented “decommodified” amenities in ways that
both alleviated and ensured inequality; stimulated economic growth; and opposed anti-capitalist
organizing (Garland, 2016).
Public housing and slum clearance represented modest downward redistribution of wealth
that benefited many poor urban dwellers, but worsened the plight of others. More rental units
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were demolished than created, thereby deepening the housing shortage; new units were generally
too expensive for those who had occupied cleared housing; and public housing increased and
institutionalized racial segregation in many cities (Gardland, 2016; Miller, 2014; Hirsch, 1989).
By the end of the decade, public housing construction had largely tapered off, as the nation’s
productive energies shifted to the war build-up (Bellush & Hausknecht, 1964). In general, 1930s
federal housing policy was aimed at preserving the capitalist order by stimulating the economy;
concern with the housing problems faced by poor urban and rural dwellers was largely ancillary.
In its capacity as a reformist institution, the welfare state maintains a contradictory and
extremely complicated relation to capitalism. “In welfare state societies,” Garland wrote,
“privately-determined economic action and publicly-determined social protection are shackled
together. The result is a contradictory hybrid in which each structure works to sustain but also to
undermine the other” (2016: 52). Welfare programs buoy capitalism by providing a level of basic
subsistence for some. They institutionalize inequality by distributing resources unevenly by race,
class, gender, and geography. At the same time, however, they provide a measure of protection
and opportunity to some. Welfare programs are meant simultaneously to stimulate growth,
prevent radical organizing, and alleviate social and economic harms. For this reason, the
meaning and extent of welfare programs are the object of intense struggle. Workers organize to
force downward distributions of wealth through tax reform; minimum wage increases; legal
protections; and the provision of social services like housing, transportation, General Assistance,
and many other means. At the same time, capitalist factions organize (often at cross purposes) to
build states and tweak policy for their own benefit. For example, as Desmond showed, the
National Association of Realtors has lobbied for decades to preserve the MID: “a government
subsidy that increases the prices of homes they build and sell” (Desmond, 2017).
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In the late 1940s, real estate interests successfully organized to increase federal outlays
for private housing activities. In 1945, a representative of the National Association of Real Estate
Boards asserted before the US Senate that the current housing shortage should be addressed
through deregulation. The government should intervene in labor disputes and streamline the
production of materials so that a large-scale private homebuilding program could progress
uninhibited (Farr, n.d.). The role of the federal government, according to real estate interests,
should be to clear the way for private construction; this, as opposed to federal, state, and local
housing authorities building housing directly. The Housing Act of 1949 reflected this sentiment.
“There [was] apparent in the law,” wrote Bellush and Hausknecht, “a not-too-subtle shift to
concern with private enterprise rather than the very real housing need of the society” (1967: 13).
The major responsibility for the provision of housing was placed with private real estate
interests. As before, federal money was provided to clear aging residential districts; but after
1949, the requirements for public housing construction were substantially decreased. The private
real estate industry surely produced more market-rate housing as a result of these provisions. But
the “slums” where poor people lived were demolished and redeveloped with few requirements to
provide displaced residents with affordable replacement housing. Following the Housing Act of
1954, this trend was increased. In addition to private housing and some public housing, federal
funding was diverted to redevelopment for non-residential uses, such as civic and commercial
expansions.
In 1937 public housing in the US advanced myriad purposes. The program was intended,
in part, to provide decent shelter to poor urban dwellers; diffuse radical anti-capitalist demands;
and stimulate the private construction industry, which was then, as now, an integral facet of the
national economy. By the end of the following decade, however, with the Second World War
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ended and the economic crises of the 1930s no longer directly threatening elites, real estate and
other private interests organized to dismantle the modest redistributions of wealth instituted
between 1932 and 1937. These political reorganizations were institutionalized, in part, by the
Housing Acts of 1949 and 1954, which directed federal, state, and local resources toward the
private housing industry and away from poor urban dwellers. Said differently, elites, through
political struggle, built and reformed the state’s capacity to redistribute resources upward.
The ramifications of this political struggle were observable surrounding the housing crisis in
postwar Los Angeles.
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CHAPTER 2
From Public Housing to Private Redevelopment
In postwar Los Angeles, housing was a serious problem. There was widespread lack of
affordable housing for L.A.’s working class. As a result, workers were often crowded into
dilapidated buildings, or wherever they could find shelter. Factions from across the political
spectrum proposed solutions to this problem. But most solutions provided scant relief for illhoused Angelenos.
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, liberal reformers held powerful positions in L.A.
Reformers proposed large-scale planning and redevelopment, including public housing
construction for thousands of low-income families. In the early 1950s, however, an insurgent
faction of real estate and other business interests organized to oppose public housing by equating
it with Communism and Socialism. Elites successfully pushed for federal, state, and local
legislation that prioritized private redevelopment over public housing construction. Los Angeles
business interests were ultimately successful in their bid for power. In the immediate postwar,
the city was a national leader in public housing provision. After a spectacular debate over public
housing in the early 1950s, however, L.A. definitively ended its public housing campaign. As a
result of their political organizing, local elites managed to restructure in significant ways the
priorities of the federal, state, and local welfare state in order to subsidize real estate speculation
and Central Business District gentrification.
In 1945, at the height of the housing crisis in Los Angeles, the California Redevelopment
Law was created. Redevelopment was a significant turning point in the state’s approach to the
housing question. With public housing, the state directly addressed the provision of housing for
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low-income people and exercised maximum control over the planning, construction, and
management of these developments. Redevelopment, on the other hand, grew the responsibility
of private entities with regard to housing provision and urban development. At the same time,
while private entities were allowed to profit from redevelopment, public agencies shouldered a
great deal of the costs for acquiring and preparing redevelopment areas. The shift from public
housing provision to redevelopment was, broadly speaking, a shift from social service provision
to subsidized profit. California, which established the first redevelopment agencies in the US,
was the breeding ground for this political economic shift.
Affordability, Growth Liberalism, and Public Housing
By 1945 the housing shortage in Los Angeles was acute. About 162,000 families,
including 50,00 veterans, writes historian Donald Parson, “were living in tents, garages, trailers,
and firetrap hotels. They were doubled- and tripled-up in existing houses, sleeping on boats in
the harbor or in buses without tires” (Parson, 2005: 76). Returning veterans were given priority
for public housing. But, in that year, not a single vacant public housing unit was available and
the waiting list had grown to 6,000 families (Parson, 2005: 76). Those displaced by highway
expansion therefore were left to fend for themselves in a fiercely competitive rental housing
market. As a result, many thousands were prevented from securing decent or stable housing.
In a 1947 report prepared by the Los Angeles City Planning Commission, the California
Housing Authority, and Mayor Fletcher Bowron’s Emergency Housing Committee, it was
estimated that more than 250,000 additional housing units were needed by 1948. At the
contemporary rate of homebuilding, the report went on to state, that number would not be
reached for more than seven years – over which time the need would surely increase due to
population growth, structural deterioration, and the clearance of housing units for highway
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expansion. The Planning Commission doubted the ability of the private housing industry to
adequately meet this need (Parson, 2005: 89).
Charles L. Parr, a real estate entrepreneur and representative of the Apartment House
Association of Los Angeles, during a public hearing on the matter, disputed the existence of a
housing shortage. There was, by Parr’s estimate, a surplus of housing – enough to accommodate
170,560 persons. Rent controls imposed by the Office of Price Administration, he asserted, were
responsible for the “artificial” shortage (Qtd. in Parson, 2005: 67). Because rent controls
minimized returns on real estate investment, he suggested, homebuilders were discouraged from
undertaking new construction. Mr. Parr’s request for rental market deregulation may indeed have
encouraged developers to ramp up housing construction. This, however, would have done little
to address the housing shortage. Real estate speculation in the suburbs already exceeded demand
(Dear, 1996). But L.A.’s working class, in the aggregate, found this housing to be out of reach.
Contemporary economic studies showed average manufacturing earnings in L.A. were almost 30
percent less than the minimum standard of living (Alexander & Bryant, 1951). Thus, at
midcentury, the city’s poor and working class (disproportionately African Americans, Mexican
Americans, and Asian Americans, but also many poor whites) had few opportunities for decent
housing.
L.A.’s “housing crisis” was not precisely a housing shortage; it was a crisis of
affordability. There may indeed have been, as Parr asserted, a sufficient stock of housing to
provide shelter to the estimated 162,000 persons unstably housed in 1945. But the “surplus”
buildings identified by the Apartment House Association of Los Angeles had not been
constructed for the purpose of providing shelter. They were intended, rather, to generate profit.
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City planners Robert Alexander and Drayton Bryant, in a 1951 publication entitled
Rebuilding a City, elaborated this point. They were doubtful of the private housing industry’s
ability to address L.A.’s housing crisis. Private homebuilding, they wrote, entailed “limited
public purpose and even less public control” (9). For developers, housing was a commodity.
“When private large-scale lenders invest money in housing,” Alexander and Bryant explained,
“[it is] in order to earn a return on their capital.” This imperative to profit was inimical to
affordability. “Inability to pay for decent housing,” the planners wrote, “is the basic economic
fact which chains the great majority of families to slum areas … [where] not more than 10 to 20
percent of the families can afford to rent or buy existing minimum housing elsewhere” (6).
To fill the void left by the private housing industry, Alexander and Bryant proposed “a
broad-scale economic, social, and physical planning program, one part of which is an integrated
housing and redevelopment program” (5). In the absence of large-scale planning, speculation
would continue unabated; low-income housing needs would continue to be unmet. Even if
private developers chose to redevelop aging residential areas (which they rarely did, due to high
cost of land downtown) new units would be wildly unaffordable for the low-income residents
who lived in these areas. In Alexander and Bryant’s view, public housing was the only solution.
Municipal housing authorities were prevented from speculating on real estate or garnering profit
from housing and their activities were subject to public control. In other words, housing
authorities treated housing as shelter rather than commodity.
Public housing was seen as a necessary component of a city-wide redevelopment plan.
Between 1940 and 1948 the Planning Department, in collaboration with the Health Department
and nascent Community Redevelopment Agency, studied ten “blighted” areas - home to more
than 93,000 people – for potential redevelopment (Alexander & Bryant, 1951: 20). If these areas
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were redeveloped without a simultaneous expansion of the low-rent housing stock, displaced
residents would likely be forced to move to areas where crowding and structural deterioration
were equally poor or worse. Alexander and Bryant therefore advocated that less-dense areas
should be given priority for redevelopment. Initial projects, the planners asserted, should host a
mix of low-rent, medium-rent, and luxury housing, as well as commercial properties – thereby
nurturing cross-class communities of mixed use. The availability of low-rent public housing in
other areas that were less developed would also ensure that residents displaced from centrallylocated neighborhoods by successive redevelopment would have the option to relocate (Bryant &
Alexander, 1951).
For example, Bunker Hill, home to 13,882 people on ninety-eight acres in 1940, was the
densest residential district in Los Angeles. A great many of the Hill’s residents were poor; many
received income only from old-age pensions, disability payments, or low-paid or marginal work.
The “problem of moving and rehousing” these individuals, Alexander and Bryant stated, “is the
chief stumbling block to any redevelopment program for Bunker Hill” (45). Thus, the planners
proposed Chavez Ravine should be redeveloped first, in order to provide relocation housing for
Bunker Hill’s residents. “The Chavez Ravine area,” they wrote, “is the one central area which
can be of major assistance in the eventual rebuilding of Bunker Hill. Since it is made up largely
of vacant land [… it may] be the fulcrum on which to raise the entire long-term redevelopment
program” (45). Alexander and architect Richard Neutra proposed the Elysian Park Heights
project for Chavez Ravine. The complex would provide housing for 17,000 residents – 3,364
units in twenty-four thirteen-story towers on a 278-acre site. In addition to housing, the project
would contain three churches, three schools, kindergartens, nurseries, a Community Hall, a
1,500-person auditorium, and a commercial center (Parson, 2005). This modern facility would
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anchor the planner’s city-wide redevelopment vision by providing housing for the current
residents of Chavez Ravine as well as those displaced from Bunker Hill and other proposed
redevelopment sites.
A brief aside is in order here. Alexander, Bryant, and other liberal planners in Los
Angeles during the postwar years were interested primarily in growth. Humanitarian concern,
though earnest and genuine, was subsidiary to liberal planners’ vision of a city nurtured by
vigorous and sustained capitalism. In Rebuilding a City, Alexander and Bryant expressed at
length their concerns over falling tax revenue. Property tax was the major source of local revenue
for the city. But, they stated, the city faced a significant tax problem for two reasons. First, rising
unemployment coupled with disinvestment in certain neighborhoods. Families faced mounting
pressure as wages stagnated or disappeared and housing costs rose. Some secured housing in the
area by doubling up with friends or relatives; others moved away. As a result, vacancies,
foreclosures, tax delinquency, and a dwindling tax base reduced city revenues. Secondly, rising
inflation caused the cost of municipal operations to increase (Alexander & Bryant, 1951). In
short, costs rose out of proportion with revenue. “As a consequence,” Alexander and Bryant
asserted, “the better areas of the city must produce not only enough revenue to pay for the
services which they themselves receive, but must produce a large surplus to help carry the load
of the tax-deficient areas. The owners of the average and better-than-average properties are thus
subsidizing the owners of the tax-deficient property” (1). The problem of falling tax revenues
was, the planners stated plainly, “the principal economic justification for rebuilding uneconomic
areas” (22). Redevelopment’s principal aim, by corollary, was to raise land values and increase
tax revenue.
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In addition to new, modern, and economically productive buildings, planners hoped that
redevelopment would encourage wealthy Angelenos to live and consume in redeveloped areas.
Suburbanization had substantially undercut downtown commercial activity. High-end commerce
had relocated, along with wealthy residents, to outlying districts. “Many stores which once
featured high-priced, high quality goods,” the planners lamented, “now carry cheaper
merchandise to attract the trade of the low-income groups in the surrounding blighted and nearblighted areas.” Swaths of dilapidated housing would be removed, according to Alexander and
Bryant’s plan, and replaced with “governmental, commercial, or light industrial areas [… as well
as] livable, residential neighborhoods that would attract families in the middle, and even some in
the upper, income groups” (2). While contemporary planning emphasized highways as the
solution to this problem – allowing wealthy residents to travel by car from suburbs to the
traditional downtown commercial district – Alexander and Bryant believed that commerce could
best be sustained if wealthy residents actually lived in the vicinity.
Despite this, proposals advanced by liberal planners did represented modest redistribution
of resources to poor urban dwellers – most clearly through the provision of public housing.
Thousands of low-income families in Los Angeles were able to secure inexpensive, stable, and
decent housing as a result of public housing construction. Public housing in Los Angeles was
racially integrated and served as a platform for working-class solidarity. The modest security and
communality provided by public housing allowed workers to build and renovate broad political
capacities. “Within the public housing projects,” writes Parson about postwar public housing in
Los Angeles, “political expression emerged from the communal experiences of tenants as they
organized around issues of self-management, shared housework, day care, opposition to racism,
and confrontation of hostile real estate interests” (Parson, 2005: 69). Grassroots organizing was
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channeled upward, shaping political organizing on a national scale. The AFL, for example,
called for the construction of 500,000 units of housing per year in combination with a nationwide
slum-clearance program. The CIO, likewise, advocated for the construction of 1.5 million
housing units (at least 500,000 publicly owned) over twenty years (Parson, 2005).
In the immediate postwar, Los Angeles was a national leader of public housing provision.
In 1945, 53,469 Angelenos lived in 12,275 units of public housing (Parson, 2005). In 1949 the
City of Los Angeles, with unanimous support from the city council, contracted with the federal
government to construct 10,000 additional public housing units (Parson, 2005). L.A., according
to the City Housing Authority, was on its way to becoming “the nation’s first city free of bad
housing” (Qtd. in Parson, 2005: 76). But this goal was to be cut short.
From Public Housing to Private Redevelopment
In 1952 and 1953, a well-organized coalition of real estate interests organized a fierce
red-baiting campaign in opposition to the 10,000 proposed units of public housing. With
publishing support from the Los Angeles Times, which had substantial real estate investment in
the downtown area, real estate interests widely distributed pamphlets which dubbed Mayor
Bowron’s City Housing Authority the “GESTAPO HOUSING AUTHORITY” (Qtd. in Gottleib
& Wolt, 1977: 260). Local real estate entrepreneur Fritz Burns, founder of Committee Against
Socialist Housing (CASH), bought billboards across the city that warned, “Don’t pay somebody
else’s rent!” CASH printed ads in the Times and other sympathetic papers with headlines such as,
“CRIME In Public Housing!” (Qtd. in Parson, 2005: 76). Local real estate interests took to the
streets, public hearings, and news media to push the notion that public housing was a dangerous,
communistic institution that posed a threat to Americans’ way of life.
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In January 1952, amidst mounting political pressure, the Los Angeles City Council
unanimously agreed to submit the public housing contract to a city-wide vote. The Council did
not have the authority to rescind the approval of the City Housing Authority’s contract with the
federal government. And if the contract was broken, Los Angeles would owe the federal
government over $13 million. The Council, however, apparently felt that public sentiment
against public housing had grown enough since 1949 that their support of public housing
construction may undermine their chances for reelection. In June 1952, the majority of voters
chose to cancel the public housing contract.
Due largely to his support of public housing, Mayor Bowron lost his 1953 reelection bid
to conservative businessman Norris Poulson. After taking office, Poulson, in defiance of a
California Supreme Court ruling that stated Los Angeles must carry out the FHA contract,
pushed through an Ordinance that officials ended the city’s adherence to the 1949 Housing
Contract. Only about 4,000 new units were constructed instead of the planned 10,000. And these
scant units were the last to be constructed in Los Angeles up to present day.
To better understand what I mean by pro-redevelopment real estate elites it may be
helpful to observe the Downtown Business Men’s Association (DBMA). A powerful proredevelopment advocate, the DBMA represented over 250 downtown businesses – principally,
bankers, insurance and energy corporations, prominent newspapers, and department stores
(Downtown Busines Men’s Association, 1959). During one public hearing, Walter J.
Braunschwiger (President, DBMA and Executive Vice President, Bank of America) promoted
the Bunker Hill Redevelopment Project as “important to the future growth and continuing wellbeing of the Los Angeles metropolitan area as an active, convenient, functional, attractive, and
healthy [city].” A thriving and profitable downtown, according to Braunschwiger, was essential
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to L.A.’s growth and well-being. He added that the central business district generated tax
revenue and retail sales far in excess of its size relative to the total area of the City. But, he
complained, “blight” was “sapping economic and tax-producing strength” (Braunschwiger,
1955). In the opinion of the DBMA, redevelopment would correct “blight” insofar as it would
invigorate downtown’s tax base and make it an attractive and accessible area for middle-class
consumers to reside.
Downtown department stores, perhaps even more so than banking, insurance, and energy
corporations, staked their future on downtown redevelopment. Since the beginning of the
twentieth century, department stores had enormous influence over L.A. politics, culture, and
urban development. As Richard Longstreth writes, “No other kind of business activity and no
infrastructural project appears to have matched the impact of [department stores] in setting the
main paths and parameters of downtown [L.A.] into the mid-twentieth century” (1997: 24).
L.A.’s pattern of development in the first two decades of the century largely coalesced around
department stores. This meant, in other words, that department stores had enormous investments
at stake in the continued prosperity of downtown L.A.
How, specifically, did investment on the part of department store owners shape
downtown? In short, during the first decades of the twentieth century the development of L.A.’s
urban core was directly tied to department store expansion – more so, even, than public
infrastructural development. Flagship construction was combined with real estate speculation on
undeveloped land adjacent to the nineteenth century urban core. This practice secured profits as
well as cultural, economic, and political supremacy for several reasons. Owners acquired cheaper
land and won greater profits through speculation than retail alone. And, to undercut competitors
located on congested downtown streets, new flagships were built along outlying roads –
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providing easy access from middle- and upper-class residential tracts. Thus, between 1900 and
1920, the commercial center of L.A. expanded horizontally, drifting several blocks south and
west. Central business district expansion was hampered by Bunker Hill on the west side,
however, and new areas soon became as congested as the old (Longstreth, 1997).
Bullock’s department store is one example of this. Its flagship, constructed 1906-1907,
was sited a few blocks south of the commercial center. Over the next ten years, Bullock’s
expanded its floor area to nearly 460,000 square feet by constructing a new skyscraper and
purchasing several adjacent buildings (Longstreth, 1997). Congestion soon followed, however.
And, as Angelenos’ early love affair with automobiles grew in the late 1920s, retail expansion
progressed to areas well beyond downtown to provide convenient access to middle- and upperclass consumers. Bullock’s, for its part, opened a branch in 1929 on Wilshire Boulevard,
complete with valet parking (Longstreth, 1997).
The imperative to seek new markets further and further afield contributed to the decline
of the central business district. This was evident by 1930, when a major tourist guide observed
downtown was “experiencing serious competition from the sections developing along main
arteries and in the suburbs of the greater city” (Federal Writers Project, 2011: 145). Between
1930 and 1950 construction downtown was at a standstill. Major property owners, led by the
DBMA and major department store owners, attempted remodeling. When this failed to stimulate
growth, however, they changed course.
In contemporary Chicago, which witnessed analogous development, “powerful but
severely threatened” downtown business leaders harnessed expanded state power to implement
downtown redevelopment (Hirsch, 1978). This proved to be the case in Los Angeles, as well.
P.G. Winnett, Chairman of Bullock’s was a major ally of the CRA during the 1950s. During one
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Council Public Hearing, he spoke in support of the CRA’s plan, stating that redevelopment
would “stabilize” property values, which had been stagnant or falling in recent years (City Clerk,
1956). B.O. Miller, president of Great Los Angeles Plans, Incorporated (another business
association whose membership largely overlapped with the DBMA) insisted downtown must be
improved to increase tax revenue. The CRA’s plan, he added, would be completed without cost
to taxpayers (City Clerk, 1956).
Between 1954 and 1959, downtown business elites aggressively lobbied councilmembers
to support the total redevelopment of Bunker Hill. They accepted the characterizations of blight
on Bunker Hill advanced by the CRA and allied city agencies. By replacing low-cost single room
occupancy housing with high rise luxury apartments, by replacing low-income and working-class
residents with upper-class consumers, the downtown commercial district would, on the one hand,
benefit from an influx of well-to-do shoppers, and, on the other, be relieved of burdensome tax
rates.
In 1945, at the height of the housing crisis in Los Angeles, the California Redevelopment
Law was created. Redevelopment was a significant turning point in the state’s approach to the
housing question. With public housing, the state directly addressed the provision of housing for
low-income people and exercised maximum control over the planning, construction, and
management of these developments. Redevelopment, on the other hand, grew the responsibility
of private entities with regard to housing provision and urban development. At the same time,
while private entities were allowed to profit from redevelopment, public agencies shouldered a
great deal of the costs for acquiring and preparing redevelopment areas. The shift from public
housing provision to redevelopment was, broadly speaking, a shift from social service provision
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to subsidized profit. California, which established the first redevelopment agencies in the US,
was the breeding ground for this political economic shift.
According to California Redevelopment Law (CRL) redevelopment agencies, responsible
for organizing redevelopment projects, could be established at the local level. Redevelopment
agencies were empowered to acquire, sell, and develop land; finance its own operations by
borrowing public money and selling bonds; impose land use and development controls; and the
obligation to relocate persons by redevelopment. The ideological and structural arrangements of
redevelopment policies traced to President Hoover’s 1932 Conference on Home Building and
Home Ownership, which proposed large-scale, centralized “district replanning” at the local level.
In the early 1940s, the Federal Housing Authority and Urban Land Instituted advocated for
replanning and redevelopment to be carried out by state-enabled local redevelopment
commissions that would use federal funds to acquire land in dilapidated districts and sell or lease
it to private developers (Marks, 2004). In California, redevelopment was seen as a means to
entice private investment in “blighted” districts by offering initial public funding.
Redevelopment agencies typically borrowed money, through the issuance of bonds, in order to
offer this initial funding to developers.
Bunker Hill was the densest neighborhood in Los Angeles. According to a 1957 study by
the Los Angeles Department of Building and Safety, 60% of the area’s 362 properties were
“dangerous” and required demolition (Department of Building and Safety, 1957). Before the
powers of redevelopment were created, developers would have to purchase individual properties,
demolish those structures designated as officially “dangerous,” and then build new structures.
This process, according to contemporary real estate advocates, was too expensive and arduous.
Planners and other city officials argued this incremental process was not sufficient to eliminate
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blight in large areas. Redevelopment was advanced as the solution. The CRA bought all 362
properties on Bunker Hill, demolished them, regraded the hill, constructed new streets and other
necessary infrastructure, and divided the land into ready-to-develop properties. This preparatory
development was funded by federal grants and bonds issued by the CRA. The prepared
properties were sold to developers at costs below what the CRA had initially paid.
The Community Redevelopment Agency (CRA), created under Mayor Fletcher Bowron
in 1948, was the public bureaucracy that organized Bunker Hill’s redevelopment. City planners
in the 1940s believed private development alone could not work on a scale large enough to
provide adequate housing and correct urban decay. Thus, they pushed for state legislation that
would institutionalize the power to condemn, clear, and redevelop land (Marks, 2004). The
California Redevelopment Law of 1945 made it possible to create local redevelopment agencies
with authority to acquire, sell, and develop land; finance its own operations by borrowing public
money and selling bonds; impose land use and development controls; and the obligation to
relocate persons displaced by redevelopment (Marks, 2004).
As with contemporary federal housing policy, the California Redevelopment Law of
1945 reflected conflicting efforts of advocates for low-income housing and business and real
estate interests who sought to rejuvenate lagging commercial districts (Marks, 2004). This
tension shaped the resulting pattern of urban growth and development. In L.A., as elsewhere, city
officials, business and real estate elites successfully organized redevelopment to increase tax
revenue, raise land values, and facilitate middle- and upper-class consumption in downtown
commercial districts. Urban Redevelopment policy between 1940 and 1960, state David Madden
and Peter Marcuse, “was seen by its proponents as a means of strengthening downtown and
eliminating the sight of urban decay nearby. Supporters were not concerned with aiding those
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who were poorly housed but with tearing down areas they considered to be slums – at least those
located near major business centers.” (2016: 131). L.A. City Planners advanced the construction
of low-income housing as justification for the Redevelopment Law (Marks, 2004); but, the
resulting redevelopment projects did not resolve the housing shortage or improve the quality of
life for poor residents of downtown. Although the CRA would over the next sixty years finance
the construction or rehabilitation of more than 28,000 units of low-cost housing, the vast
majority of these were sited outside of the central business district (Marks, 2004). In other words,
the intent of redevelopment was to secure Downtown L.A. for commercial and luxury housing
development, while evacuating thousands of low-income residents.
The CRA’s Board of Commissioners – appointed by Mayor Bowron – was dominated by
downtown business and real estate elites. Under their administration, the CRA explicitly and
repeatedly stated that federal, state, and city Urban Redevelopment outlays would be used to
construct luxury housing and institutional headquarters, thereby raising Bunker Hill and adjacent
property values. CRA Chairman and oil and real estate heir William Sesnon emphasized that
Bunker Hill’s annual tax revenue would increase more than six fold following redevelopment
(Sesnon, 1955b). “The purpose here,” he stated, “is to use the Community Redevelopment
Agency’s power of eminent domain to clear out slum and sub-standard housing conditions, and
restore the land to its highest use in keeping with its location in the heart of a thriving
metropolis” (Sesnon, 1955c). Bunker Hill’s land use was more than just out-of-place; in the eyes
of CRA and other pro-redevelopment officials, the Hill undermined profitable developments in
the area. “This decaying area threatens both the expanding Civic Center and downtown business
district,” stated one CRA pamphlet (CRA, n.d.). The Agency and city social service agencies
pointed to the presence of alcoholics, high rates of tuberculosis, fire hazards, crowded and
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substandard housing to argue that Bunker Hill was a decrepit anachronism in the heart of a
modernizing city. Quite explicitly, the Hill was viewed as a cancer whose spread could only be
prevented through removal.
What would the appropriate land use for Bunker Hill be, according to the CRA? Over
radio waves, newspaper broadsides, and in public hearings between 1954 and 1956, the Agency
promoted their answer to this question. Sesnon summed up the CRA’s goals in a presentation to
Mayor Poulson, city agencies, and members of the City Council in 1956:
In launching this program, we propose to eliminate a number of extremely sub-standard and poor
rooming houses and hotel units which constitute a menace to health and lives. We seek to clear
blighted conditions which have raised disease, crime, and juvenile delinquency rates above the
community average. We seek the demolition of wooden frame structures, as much as eight stories
high, which constitute a serious fire hazard (Sesnon, 1956).

Where “blighted conditions” then prevailed, Sesnon explained, the CRA would erect “modern,
privately-owned and operated buildings … All this, I might add, on the basis of our own free
enterprise system” (Sesnon, 1954).
The CRA’s Bunker Hill plan featured residential, commercial, and “civic-trade” uses.
This included apartments, shopping centers, parking, office buildings, a “major hotel”, and,
tentatively, a civic auditorium including “convention and trade show exhibition areas and a
music center.” (CRA, n.d.). The Hill’s new residents, according to the CRA, would be office
workers and civic employees. In addition, several thousand tourists and out-of-town businessmen
would find luxury accommodations in a large new hotel. The entire area, stated the CRA in a
press release, would have “an almost park-like appearance” (CRA, n.d.); Bunker Hill residents,
office workers, and visitors could luxuriate in plazas and planted gardens during lunch breaks,
weekends, or visits.
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Before the gleaming new buildings could be erected, or the landscaped plazas planted,
the CRA would “prepare” the land. The Agency would buy or condemn property; demolish all
existing structures; completely regrade the Hill (reducing its elevation by more than 100 feet in
places); construct utilities; and adjust the street pattern (CRA, 1970). The plan was, in short, a
massive infrastructural project to completely refiguring the area. The erasure of Bunker Hill’s
landscape - the removal of people, earth, brick, wood, concrete, and glass – would, according to
the CRA’s rationale, erase social and economic problems characterized as “blight,” “disease,”
and “crime.”
By exercising maximum control over Bunker Hill’s land use, the CRA hoped that Bunker
Hill’s transformation would improve the surrounding area as well. The Agency, in collaboration
with city Planning officials, would rezone the area (CRA, 1970). Nearly 20,000 parking spaces
would also be created, to facilitate access to the civic center and downtown area for middle- and
upper-class white suburban commuters. Pedestrian and automobile traffic would be integrated to
facilitate “convenient pedestrian circulation, … higher land usage,” and the efficient flow of
traffic between the Harbor Freeway to the west and downtown streets to the east (CRA, 1970).
The CRA was required by law to relocate displaced residents. Sesnon insisted the CRA
would find housing for displaced people “in approximately the same price range” as that
available on Bunker Hill (Sesnon, 1954). But he pointed to a similar redevelopment project in
New York City where only seven percent of displaced residents “needed help in getting
reestablished in new dwellings” (Sesnon, 1954). And, indeed, when it came time for the CRA to
set aside funds for relocation the budgeted for only seven percent of the Hill’s population.
Nevertheless, he claimed redevelopment would “relieve” the Hill’s elderly residents of their poor
housing conditions and relocate them in “new, better designed, and more fitting housing”
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(Sesnon, 1955). Whereas “modern, clean and attractive” homes were proposed for 20,000 people
on Bunker Hill, it was unclear if these would be made available to the area’s elderly and other
residents.
How would the CRA finance the Bunker Hill project? And, more importantly, how
would they sidestep accusations of “Socialism” or “Communism” which had undermined the
recent proposals for public housing construction? On this, the CRA was adamant: “ NO COST
TO TAXPAYERS,” they proclaimed in one fact sheet delivered to the City Council (CRA, n.d.).
The project costs were explained in a press release following City Council approval of the
CRA’s Redevelopment Plan in 1956. It was estimated that about $40 million would be required
to purchase all the properties on the Hill, clear the land, regrade the hill, construct utilities, and
realign streets (CRA, 1970). Two thirds of this amount would be provided by federal funds,
through both grants and loans. Federal loans, CRA officials stated, would be “repaid in part by
the ultimate sale of the land to private developers” (CRA, 1970). Since land would be sold to
developers for less than the city paid to acquire it, there would be a difference remaining. The
CRA would assume the remaining third of the project cost, estimated at about 7 million. “The
local one-third share of the Net Project Cost,” stated the CRA Redevelopment Plan, “is to be
provided by the sale of Agency tax allocation bonds” (CRA, 1970). In other words, property
taxes derived from Bunker Hill following its redevelopment would be put directly toward debt
servicing. Tax allocation bonds, also known as tax increment bonds, would be used to foot the
Agency’s $7 million bill and to repay federal loans and interest in excess of that covered by the
sale of land to developers. The final cost to the CRA, according to its Redevelopment Plan,
would be “in the neighborhood of $15,000,000” (CRA, 1970). The use of tax increment
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financing, however, allowed Agency officials to suggest that the project paid for itself, thus
posing “no cost to taxpayers.”
What is tax increment financing? In short, tax increment financing captures property tax
revenue which is then used to service debt and/or finance further redevelopment. Property tax,
like any tax, is allocated directly to the taxing authority (in this case, the City of Los Angeles); it
is, thus, public money dispensed by the municipality for public purposes. According to tax
increment financing, however, after Bunker Hill was redeveloped the City continued to receive
the same tax revenue as that generated prior to redevelopment. Any increase in property taxes
beyond this amount as a result of redevelopment and subsequent increases in land value,
however, was be siphoned directly to the CRA. This mechanism was innovated by the CRA in
1951 following the electoral defeat of a general obligation bond issue that would have financed
Bunker Hill and other redevelopment projects. CRA historian Mara Marks has noted that tax
increment financing granted the Agency financial autonomy. It was also intended to ease reliance
on federal funding, which was seen by local business leaders as “a threat to business influence
over local affairs” (Marks, 2004: 258-9).
As Marks stated, the CRA was created as “an important counter weight to the postwar
magnetic pull of new suburbs for business and investment” (241). The effect of this
counterweight works on many levels. Most obviously, in the case of Bunker Hill, the CRA
organized a large-scale infrastructural project that, in effect, focused the dispensation of public
money in one area of the city. Secondly, since developers were allowed to purchase property on
Bunker Hill at a discount, the transfer of wealth to private hands was underwritten by public
debt. Additionally, although the CRA claimed redevelopment would increase tax revenue and
thereby benefit “home owners and inhabitants of all other parts of the metropolitan area” (CRA,
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n.d.). As we have just seen, this is only partially true - tax increment financing ensured that
elevated tax revenue from Bunker Hill and other redevelopment projects would be transferred to
the CRA rather than the city at large. The problems with TIF are as follows: Money that would
otherwise go into city coffers and (ideally) be used equally throughout the city instead is
concentrated in a single area or neighborhood. TIF obscures costs. Yes, the public isn’t paying
for redevelopment directly, but those communities outside of the redevelopment area are
prevented from receiving tax dollars that would otherwise be available to them. The public may
organize to demand the city pay a more equitable social wage. The CRA, however, is more or
less protected from this demand – they aren’t the government, they are only responsible for
redevelopment projects.
Conclusion
The Bunker Hill story traces the welfare state’s expanded role in the commodification of
housing. Redevelopment was a significant turning point in the state’s approach to the housing
question. With public housing, the state directly addressed the provision of housing for lowincome people and exercised maximum control over the planning, construction, and management
of these developments. Redevelopment, on the other hand, grew the responsibility of private
entities with regard to housing provision and urban development. At the same time, while private
entities were allowed to profit from redevelopment, public agencies shouldered a great deal of
the costs for acquiring and preparing land in redevelopment areas. The shift from public housing
provision to redevelopment was, broadly speaking, a shift from social service provision to
subsidized profit. California, which established the first redevelopment agencies in the US, was
the breeding ground for this political economic shift.
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